Whose Role Is It Anyway?

The Inter-Service Race to Develop Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Today we are looking at Whose Role Is It Anyway? The Inter-Service Race to Develop Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles by Major Brennan S. Deveraux, published by Army University Press in 2023 as part of the Art of War Papers series. The book studies the early Cold War competition among US military services over missile development, focusing on the Army’s Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile program. Its ISBN is 9781940804897 for both paperback and Adobe PDF.

The central question is not simply whether the Jupiter missile was a good weapon. The deeper question is: whose role was it to develop and operate a long-range missile? Was it an Army weapon because it was surface-to-surface and could be seen as an extension of artillery? Or was it an Air Force weapon because its range and strategic purpose resembled airpower and long-range strike?

What the Book Really Is

This book is a military institutional history. It examines policy, bureaucracy, modernization, and inter-service rivalry. The author uses the Jupiter controversy as a case study to explore how the Department of Defense managed emerging technology in the 1950s.

The book is also a warning for the present. It argues that new technologies often blur service boundaries. When guidance is vague, each service can interpret the technology in a way that protects its own mission, budget, and future relevance. That is what happened with missile development in the early Cold War.

Target Audience and Context

The main audience is military professionals and defense-policy readers. This includes officers, strategists, acquisition specialists, doctrine writers, and policymakers who deal with modernization and emerging technology.

The historical context is the early Cold War. The United States had recently created a new national-security structure, including the Department of Defense and a separate Air Force. At the same time, nuclear weapons and missiles were changing the meaning of land, air, and sea power. Each service wanted to remain relevant, and each wanted a role in the future battlefield.

Structure and Learning Logic

The book begins by explaining the problem of military modernization. Resources are finite, and every major modernization choice creates opportunity costs. Missile development became the perfect example of this problem because missiles were immature, strategically important, and difficult to assign to one service.

Chapter 1 introduces the research question and explains why Jupiter matters. Chapter 2 covers the years 1947 to 1952, when service functions were first defined and missile responsibilities began to be discussed. Chapter 3 covers 1953 and 1954, when inter-service missile competition intensified. Chapter 4 focuses on 1955 and 1956, the central period of the Jupiter missile controversy. Chapter 5 examines the aftermath, including budget pressure and continued Army efforts to gain theater-support missile capability. Chapter 6 draws conclusions for emerging-technology management. The appendix gives context on pre-Jupiter Army missiles, including Honest John, Corporal, and Redstone.

Main Themes / Core Content

1. Emerging technology does not fit old categories

The book shows that missiles did not fit neatly into existing service roles. They had characteristics of artillery, aircraft, strategic bombardment, and theater support. This made them especially vulnerable to bureaucratic conflict. The Army could describe missiles as extensions of artillery, while the Air Force could describe them as strategic strike systems.

2. Ambiguous policy creates competition

A major theme is the danger of vague policy language. The 1950 and 1954 missile agreements used flexible terms that allowed services to interpret responsibilities in their own favor. The Army used this ambiguity to stretch its missile requirements outward, while the Air Force pushed for range limits to protect its strategic role.

3. The JCS was not enough to settle the issue

The book argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and similar service-based committees were not well suited to resolve disputes that limited service ambitions. The service chiefs were experts, but they also represented their services. Consensus-based decision-making produced ambiguous compromises rather than clear responsibility.

4. Duplication can speed innovation but waste resources

The book does not treat all duplication as automatically bad. Parallel programs can accelerate learning when a technical problem is urgent. But duplication also creates budget strain, opportunity costs, and public inter-service conflict. In the Jupiter case, missile spending grew rapidly and competed with other modernization needs.

5. The Secretary of Defense became decisive

The controversy was resolved when Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson clarified roles and missions in 1956. His memorandum assigned land-based IRBM operational employment to the Air Force and restricted the Army from planning missile employment beyond 200 miles. The book treats this as evidence that a central authority must make clear decisions when services cannot.

6. The modern lesson is broader than missiles

Although the case is historical, the lessons apply to current and future emerging technologies: cyber, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, hypersonics, and post-INF missile development. The author recommends continuous service-function reviews, central oversight, clear definitions, and deliberate choices about when duplication should be encouraged or prevented.

Visual Style and Evidence

The cover uses a photograph of a Jupiter missile launch. The caption identifies it as Jupiter Missile AM-6B, fired from Cape Canaveral on 17 July 1958, during the first flight test of the complete inertial guidance system. This image is highly effective because it immediately connects the institutional debate to a concrete missile system.

The book contains several useful figures. Figure 3.1 shows the focus areas of the Technological Capabilities Panel, helping explain how scientific advice shaped Cold War missile urgency. Figure 4.1 shows estimated ICBM and IRBM expenditures from 1955 to 1957, making the budgetary impact visible. Figure 5.1 shows missile expenditures and a five-year forecast, supporting the argument that duplication became economically unsustainable. The appendix includes visual examples of pre-Jupiter Army missiles: Honest John, Corporal, and Redstone.

A particularly strong visual is Figure 4.1, which compares ICBM and IRBM expenditures. It shows that IRBM costs appeared rapidly after 1955, helping explain why Eisenhower and Wilson became concerned about duplicated missile programs. Another strong visual is Figure A.3, the Redstone missile, because Redstone was the Army’s technical and institutional bridge toward Jupiter.

Strengths

The first strength is the clarity of the institutional argument. The book explains that technology problems are also organization problems. Missiles mattered not only because of range and payload, but because they forced the services to argue over identity, mission, and budget.

The second strength is the connection between history and modern policy. The book explicitly links the Jupiter controversy to present concerns about post-INF missile development and emerging technologies.

The third strength is its balanced view of duplication. The author recognizes that competition can accelerate development, but he also explains why duplication can become financially and strategically damaging.

The fourth strength is the use of policy documents, service agreements, JCS debates, and budget figures. This makes the book more than a narrative of rivalry; it becomes a study of how policy language produces real institutional behavior.

Weaknesses or Limits

The book is specialized and assumes interest in defense policy, Cold War organization, and missile development. General readers looking for a dramatic missile-history narrative may find the institutional focus demanding.

The study is also scoped mainly around the Army’s Jupiter pursuit. It does not attempt to provide a full technical history of all US missile systems or a full operational history of IRBM deployment.

Finally, the book’s strongest lessons are conceptual and policy-oriented. Readers looking for engineering details on missile design will find only limited technical discussion.

Unusual or Distinctive Points

One distinctive feature is the book’s attention to wording. It shows that phrases in policy documents can shape weapons programs, budgets, and service rivalries. Another distinctive point is the modern warning: the same problem can reappear whenever a new technology crosses old institutional boundaries.

What the Reader Actually Gains

The reader gains a strong framework for thinking about emerging military technology. The book teaches that new capabilities must be assigned, governed, and reviewed carefully. It also shows that innovation is not only a matter of invention; it is a matter of organizational design.

Final Judgment

Whose Role Is It Anyway? is a valuable and focused military-policy study. Its greatest value is showing how unclear roles can turn promising innovation into expensive inter-service rivalry. It is recommended for readers interested in Cold War missile history, defense reform, military modernization, and the management of emerging technology.

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